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A unique feature of the human species is compliance with social norms, e.g., fairness,
even though this normative decision means curbing self-interest. However, sometimes
people prefer to pursue wealth at the expense of moral goodness. Specifically, deviations
from a fairness-related normative choice have been observed in the presence of a
high monetary incentive. The neural mechanism underlying this deviation from the
fairness-related normative choice has yet to be determined. In order to address this issue,
using functional magnetic resonance imaging we employed an ultimatum game (UG)
paradigm in which fairness and a proposed monetary amount were orthogonally varied.
We found evidence for a significant modulation by the proposed amount on fairness in
the right lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the bilateral insular cortices. Additionally, the
insular subregions showed dissociable modulation patterns. Inter-individual differences in
the modulation effects in the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) accounted for inter-individual
differences in the behavioral modulation effect as measured by the rejection rate,
supporting the concept that the PFC plays a critical role in making fairness-related
normative decisions in a social interaction condition. Our findings provide neural evidence
for the modulation of fairness by monetary incentives as well as accounting for
inter-individual differences.
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“To attain to this envied situation, the candidates for fortune too fre-
quently abandon the paths of virtue; for unhappily, the road which
leads to the one, and that which leads to the other, lie sometimes in
very opposite direction.”
—Adam Smith: The theory of moral sentiments
INTRODUCTION
A unique feature of human beings is compliance with social
norms even though this normative decision means curbing self-
interest (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012), which is another charac-
teristic of human beings (Hobbes, 1994; Miller, 1999). However,
sometimes money talks. In other words, people sometimes pre-
fer to pursue wealth at the cost of moral goodness. How human
beings make a normative decision when facing a large monetary
temptation within a social interaction context is an interesting
question.
The ultimatum game (UG) nicely illustrates fairness, a salient,
and elementary norm (Roth et al., 1991; Henrich, 2000), and pro-
vides a good paradigm for describing deviations from fairness-
related normative choices. In this game, two players have to agree
on how to split a sum of money (stake). Player A (the proposer)
makes a proposal about how to divide the money. If player B (the
responder) accepts this proposal, the suggested split is realized.
If the responder rejects this proposal, neither of the two receives
anything. In either case, the game is then over (Güth et al., 1982).
If the responder acts in his or her own economic self-interest, s/he
should accept the smallest amount of money offered. However, a
key observation in this game has been that responders accept fair
proposals that are close to an equal split and tend to punish pro-
posers who offer unfair proposals (usually less than 20–30% of
the total stake), even at a cost to themselves (Güth et al., 1982;
Camerer, 2003). The unfair proposals are viewed as a violation of
the fairness norm and the rejection of unfair proposals is, there-
fore, a normative decision (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012). During
this decision process, the responders face two competing goals—
a self-interest goal and a fairness goal. Implementation of this
normative decision means that the responders succeed in curb-
ing their self-interest goal, i.e., maximizing their economic gain
by accepting the low offer, in order to pursue their fairness goal,
i.e., punishing the proposer for the unfair offer by rejecting it.
Previous behavioral studies that used the UG showed devi-
ations from the fairness-related normative decision as a result
of high monetary incentives. At high stakes, responders tend to
reduce the threshold below which they reject proposals (Straub
and Murnighan, 1995; Hoffman et al., 1996; Slonim and Roth,
1998; Cameron, 1999; Munier and Zaharia, 2003; Bechler, 2013),
although a few studies reported that stake size did not affect
the rejection rate in the UG (Carpenter et al., 2005). This
commonly-found deviation from the fairness-related normative
choice at a high stake has been nicely accounted for by oppor-
tunity cost (Bechler, 2013), which indicates that, when a larger
initial sum of money is used, the cost of rejecting an offer
increases and the material utility of accepting an offer increases.
However, the neural substrate underlying this deviation from the
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fairness-related normative choice when facing a high monetary
temptation in the UG is still to be determined.
Previous neuroimaging studies, all of which used small stake
sizes, have revealed a neural network involved with fairness-
related normative choice. This network includes the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, insula,
and other regions such as the medial prefrontal cortex, ante-
rior cingulate cortex (ACC), and amygdala (Sanfey et al., 2003;
Tabibnia et al., 2008; Guroglu et al., 2010, 2011; Baumgartner
et al., 2011; Gospic et al., 2011). However, the neural substrate
underlying deviations from the fairness-related normative choice
in UG has rarely been investigated. Using brain stimulation tech-
niques which temporally inhibit the function of the DLPFC,
researchers identified a role for the right DLPFC in facilitat-
ing fairness-related normative decisions (van’t Wout et al., 2005;
Knoch et al., 2006a,b, 2008). By combining a brain stimulation
technique with fMRI, a recent study verified that the right DLPFC
and its functional communication with the posterior part of ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex play a causal role in facilitating a
fairness-related normative decision in contexts in which fairness
is in conflict with self-interest (Baumgartner et al., 2011).
The goal of the current study was to identify the neural sub-
strates underlying deviations from the fairness-related normative
choice caused by a monetary incentive. One Way to address this
modulation of fairness by the monetary incentives is by within-
experiment comparisons of brain activation under different mon-
etary incentives, holding all else constant. We hypothesized that
monetary incentives may modulate fairness and proposed several
candidate regions for these psychological processes. Specifically,
we proposed two candidate regions as the ones whose activa-
tions might be modulated by the monetary incentives on fairness.
One is the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC). A large stake size may
amplify the self-interest goal, and thusmore cognitive effort needs
to be exerted to resolve the conflict between self-interest and fair-
ness. A suggested role of the PFC, especially the DLPFC, in the
UG is that its involvement reflects an integration-and-selection
function, which includes the inhibition of a prepotent response
and the selection of a specific response from all the possible
response options by integrating information with context-specific
rules about how to apply this information (Buckholtz andMarois,
2012). Therefore, we speculated that activation of the PFC would
bemodulated by the size of monetary incentives. The other region
that might be modulated is the insula. We speculate that mon-
etary incentives may influence fairness perception in the UG.
The insula is important in encoding fairness, and distinct func-
tional dissociations of insular subregions have been found in the
UG. The anterior insular cortex is especially linked with a per-
ception of “unfairness” because of its role in processing negative
emotional reactions (Sanfey et al., 2003). The posterior insula is
related to objective inequality, as indicated by showing stronger
activation with more equal allocations (Wright et al., 2011). The
mid-insula seems to play a role in integrating the context with
inequality in the UG (Wright et al., 2011). Therefore, we spec-
ulated that activation of the insula would also be modulated by
monetary incentives and also expected to find dissociable modu-
lation patterns in insular subregions. By investigating the modu-
lation of fairness by the size of a monetary incentive, we expect
to better understand the functioning of the normal normative
decision.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
A total of 28 participants (15 females and 13 males, mean age =
25.07 ± 3.35 years, mean years of education = 17.32 ± 1.72)
were recruited through advertisement. All participants were in
good health with no previous history of psychiatric or neurolog-
ical disease and were screened for standard magnetic resonance
safety criteria. All participants gave written informed consent.
The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the
Institute of Psychology, the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND TASK
General procedure
Prior to the scanning session, the participants received instruc-
tions explaining the rules of the UG that they would be per-
forming inside the scanner, and each participant was required to
complete a series of test questions after reading the instructions
to verify their comprehension. During the scanning, the partici-
pants acted as responders in a series of rounds of the UG, during
which they might play with a computer or with a person. After
scanning, the participants rated the fairness of all the proposals
presented in the UG task on a Likert scale of 1 (very unfair) to 7
(very fair). The goal of this questionnaire was to evaluate the par-
ticipants’ subjective fairness judgment. To increase the degree of
their involvement in this experimental situation, they also made
proposals with different stake sizes as proposers and were told that
their proposals would be used in a subsequent study.
UG task description
While they were in the scanner, each participant played the role
of a responder, receiving 24 rounds of monetary proposals. Each
round had five phases (Figure 1). Each round began with a 2 s
preparation interval. The participant then saw the number of the
proposer (e.g., P01) or computer for 4 s. Next, the offer proposed
by the partner was displayed for a further 6 s. Afterwards, the
FIGURE 1 | Diagram illustrating the structure of a single round of the
ultimatum game.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 150 | 2
Zhou et al. Neural basis of normative decision
participant was asked to respond by pressing one button to accept
and another to reject the offer with a maximum of 6 s for this pro-
cess. Then the result of the choice was showed for 2 s. Half of the
proposals were from the human partners and the other half were
from the computer partners. In the human condition, the partic-
ipants were informed that proposals from real persons had been
submitted by previous participants and that in each round their
partners would be different (a single-shot game). To avoid uncon-
trolled associations, the human proposers were represented by
alphanumerical codes, not by their photos or by their real names
in accordance with a previous study (Halko et al., 2009). In the
computer condition, the participants were told that the propos-
als from the computer were randomly generated by a computer
program. In reality, all the proposals were pre-set by the exper-
imenter. Therefore, the computer condition was similar to the
human condition in terms of fairness and self-interest, except for
the fact that there was no potential for social interaction in the
computer condition. Offering the computer condition provided
us with an opportunity to investigate whether people modulate
their response to fairness by the size of a monetary incentive only
in a social interaction context.
We orthogonally manipulated fairness and monetary incen-
tives by varying both the proposal amount and the stake size
across the rounds (Table 1). Two kinds of proposals were pro-
vided, and each one fell into one of the two “fairness” categories:
50% of the stake (fair) or 20% of the stake (unfair). We used only
one unfair level, i.e., proposals of 20% of the stake, referring to
previous studies (Falk et al., 2003; Radke et al., 2012). The high
monetary incentives ranged from ¥400(≈$64) to ¥600(≈$96) and
the low ones from ¥4(≈$0.64) to ¥6(≈$0.96). In different rounds,
the same proposal amount (e.g., ¥400) could represent a larger
percentage of the total stake (50%) and could, therefore, be fair,
or a smaller percentage of the total stake (20%) and could, there-
fore, be unfair. This design controlled for potential confounding
effects of the proposal magnitude. Therefore this study was a
2 × 2 × 2 design, with proposer type (human, computer), stake
size (high, low), and fairness (50%, 20%) as within-subjects fac-
tors (Table 1). There were a total of 24 trials in our experiment
design, so there were three trials in each condition. To encour-
age participants to make real decisions, it was emphasized that in
addition to a fixed amount for participation they would be paid
according to their choices in the game.
fMRI DATA ACQUISITION
The stimuli were presented with E-prime software (Psychology
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) on a personal computer,
Table 1 | Types of offers.
Fair (50%) Unfair (20%)
Proposer–Responder Proposer–Responder
High ¥400–¥400 ¥1600–¥400
¥500–¥500 ¥2000–¥500
¥600–¥600 ¥2400–¥600
Low ¥4–¥4 ¥16–¥4
¥5–¥5 ¥20–¥5
¥6–¥6 ¥24–¥6
back-projected onto a screen using a liquid crystal display pro-
jector, and viewed by participants through a mirror mounted on
the MRI head coil. The MRI images were acquired with a 3.0
Tesla Siemens MRI scanner. Whole-brain functional scans were
collected in 32 axial slices using an echo-planar imaging (EPI)
sequence (repetition time = 2000ms, echo time = 30ms; flip
angle = 90◦, matrix = 64 × 64; field of view = 220 × 220mm2;
slice thickness = 3mm; slice gap = 1mm). Before the task fMRI,
we also acquired a 6-min resting-state scan, which was composed
of 180 volumes. These data were not used in this study.
fMRI PREPROCESSING AND ANALYSES
Image preprocessing
Image preprocessing was performed using statistical parametric
mapping (SPM5, Wellcome Department, London, UK) running
on a Matlab 7 platform (MathWorks, Natick, MA). The prepro-
cessing included slice time correction, realignment, normaliza-
tion, and resampling to 3 × 3 × 3mm3, and smoothing using an
8-mm full-width-at-half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
Category analyses
A general linear model (GLM) with a 2 (fairness) × 2 (proposer
type) × 2 (stake size) factorial design matrix was constructed
to detect the brain activation of each participant during the
proposal epochs. Specifically, a GLM was defined for each par-
ticipant. These models included eight regressors which modeled
the BOLD response to the 6 s proposal epoch: fair proposal from
a human partner, unfair proposal from a human partner, fair
proposal from a computer partner and unfair proposal from
a computer partner for each of the high and low stake sizes.
Additionally, six motion parameters obtained by realignment
were used as nuisance variables. Each regressor was convolved
with a canonical hemodynamic response function. High-pass
filtering (cutoff frequency = 128 s) was used to remove low-
frequency noise. The resulting GLM was corrected for temporal
autocorrelations using a first-order autoregressive model. First-
level contrasts were performed for each experimental condition
of the factorial design described above. A second-level random
effect analysis was completed by performing an ANOVA on
these contrasts. In the second-level analysis, we used a mask
that was created with the wfu_pickatlas tool (Tzourio-Mazoyer
et al., 2002) in SPM5. The mask was the composite of the fol-
lowing 16 bilateral regions of interest (ROI): superior frontal
cortex, middle frontal cortex, inferior frontal operculum, infe-
rior frontal triangularis, superior medial frontal cortex, superior
orbitofrontal cortex, medial frontal cortex, medial orbitofrontal
cortex, inferior orbitofrontal cortex, rectus, ACC, insula, cau-
date, thalamus, putamen, and amygdale. These ROI were selected
based on the previous literature (Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia
et al., 2008; Guroglu et al., 2010, 2011; Baumgartner et al., 2011;
Gospic et al., 2011). Significant activations of interest were iden-
tified with voxelwise p < 0.005 in conjunction with clusterwise
p < 0.05 to perform a multiple comparisons correction. If an
interaction effect was statistically significant, simple effect anal-
yses were performed using the averaged effect size extracted
from the clusters with significant interaction effects using
SPSS v17.0.
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The previous literature has suggested different roles for dif-
ferent insular subregions in fairness-related decisions (Sanfey
et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2011). Thus, it is possible that a dis-
sociable modulation effect of fairness by monetary incentives
may be observed in insular subregions. To test this hypothesis,
we parceled the insular clusters into the ventral anterior, dor-
sal anterior and mid-posterior clusters by intersecting the insular
subregions template (k = 3 solutions) (Kelly et al., 2012) with
those of our insular clusters which showed significant interaction
effects. Then, we performed simple effect analyses on each of the
resulting insular subregions separately.
Multiple regression analysis
In order to investigate the neural correlates of inter-individual dif-
ferences in the behavioral modulation effect, we defined an index
for the behavioral modulation effect. This index was the interac-
tion between fairness and stake size in rejection rate, i.e., rejection
rate [high(unfair−fair) − low(unfair−fair)]. Because the rejection rate
for fair proposals with high stake sizes was similar to that for
fair proposals with low stake sizes, the index reflected the extent
of the difference between the rejection rate for unfair proposals
with high stake sizes and that for unfair proposals with low stake
sizes. According to previous studies in which the rejection rate for
unfair proposals decreased with increased stake sizes (Straub and
Murnighan, 1995; Hoffman et al., 1996; Slonim and Roth, 1998;
Cameron, 1999; Munier and Zaharia, 2003; Bechler, 2013), a neg-
ative value of this index indicates a deviation from the normative
decision, a positive value reflects a normative decision, and zero
reflects indifference to the changes of stake size.
Multiple regression analysis was performed with the
behavioral modulation index as the covariate variable and
the neuroimaging contrasts from the modulation effect
[high(unfair−fair) − low(unfair−fair)] as the dependent variable. The
mask that was used in the category analysis was also used for the
multiple comparison correction. Significant effects were identi-
fied with voxelwise p < 0.005 in conjunction with a clusterwise
p < 0.05.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
The rejection rate was investigated by a repeated measures
ANOVA, exploring the main effects of fairness (50%, 20%),
proposer type (human, computer), stake size (high, low), and
the interaction between these factors. Mauchly’s test of sphericity
showed that the sphericity assumption was met (all ps > 0.05).
Significant main effects of fairness [F(1, 27) = 65.34, p < 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.708], stake size [F(1, 27) = 7.43, p = 0.011, partial
η2 = 0.216] and proposer type [F(1, 27) = 18.22, p < 0.001, par-
tial η2 = 0.403] were found. These main effects separately indi-
cated that unfair proposals (M = 0.47, SD = 0.28) were more
often rejected than fair ones (M = 0.05, SD = 0.07), proposals
from humans (M = 0.34, SD = 0.18) were more often rejected
than those from computers (M = 0.18, SD = 0.17), and pro-
posals with a low stake size (M = 0.31, SD = 0.17) were more
often rejected than those with a high stake size (M = 0.21, SD =
0.17). The interaction between fairness and stake size was signifi-
cant [F(1, 27) = 8.68, p = 0.007, partial η2 = 0.243]. A post-hoc
pairwise least significant difference (LSD) test indicated that
when the proposals were unfair, the rejection rates for propos-
als with a low stake size (M = 0.56, SD = 0.31) were significantly
higher than those for proposals with a high stake size (M = 0.38,
SD = 0.33) (Figure 2A). The interaction between fairness and
proposer type was also significant [F(1, 27) = 13.52, p = 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.334]. A post-hoc pairwise LSD test indicated that
the rejection rates for proposals from human partners (M =
0.60, SD = 0.32) were significantly higher than those for pro-
posals from computer partners (M = 0.34, SD = 0.33) when
the proposals were unfair (Figure 2B). There were no signifi-
cant differences in rejection rates when the proposals were fair
for these interactions. No significant interaction between stake
size and proposal type was found. There was a trend toward sig-
nificance in interaction among the three factors [F(1, 27) = 3.09,
p = 0.09, partial η2 = 0.103]. A post-hoc analysis revealed that
the rejection rate for the unfair proposals with a high stake size
was lower than that for the unfair proposals with a low stake
size in the human condition (p = 0.012), whereas this difference
only showed a trend toward significance in the computer condi-
tion (p = 0.062). In addition, we found no differences between
the rejection rate for the fair proposal with a high stake size
and that for the fair proposal with a low stake size in either
the human condition or the computer condition (ps > 0.05)
(Figure 2C).
A repeated measures ANOVA that considered the stake size
and fairness categories, was conducted to examine the subjects’
FIGURE 2 | Mean rejection rates as a function of proposal fairness for different stake sizes (A), proposer types (B), and the interaction among these
three factors (C). Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
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fairness judgments of different proposals. Mauchly’s test of
sphericity showed the sphericity assumption was met (p > 0.05).
The results showed a significant main effect of the fairness cate-
gory on the participants’ ratings of the fairness of the proposals
[F(1, 27) = 369.59, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.932], but we did not
find a significant main effect of stake size. The interaction effect
of the fairness category and stake size was marginally signifi-
cant [F(1, 27) = 3.61, p = 0.068, partial η2 = 0.118]. A post-hoc
pairwise LSD test indicated that fair proposals with a low stake
size (M = 6.45, SD = 0.79) were rated as marginally significantly
(p = 0.067) less fair than fair proposals with a high stake size
(M = 6.57, SD = 0.60). When the proposals were unfair, we
found no significant differences in fairness ratings between pro-
posals with a high stake size and proposals with a low stake size.
BRAIN ACTIVATIONS INFLUENCED BY FAIRNESS, STAKE SIZE, AND
PROPOSER TYPE
A significant main effect of fairness was found in several brain
regions. Specifically, the bilateral insula, ACC, lateral PFC showed
greater activation for unfair proposals than for fair proposals,
whereas the medial prefrontal cortex showed greater activation
for fair proposals than for unfair proposals (p < 0.05, cluster-
level correction) (Table 2 and Figure 3A). A significant main
effect of proposer type was also found, in which the bilateral
insula, ACC, medial prefrontal cortex, lateral PFC were more acti-
vated in the human proposer condition than in the computer
proposer condition (p < 0.05, cluster-level correction) (Table 2
and Figure 3B). No significant main effect of stake size was found
(p < 0.05, cluster-level correction).
BRAIN ACTIVATIONS INFLUENCED BY THE INTERACTION OF FAIRNESS
AND STAKE SIZE
Given that our primary goal was to test the influence of stake
size on fairness, an interesting contrast was computed by the
[high(unfair−fair) − low(unfair−fair)] contrast. The bilateral insula
extending to the adjacent striatum and the right middle/inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG) were found to show significant contrast (p <
0.05, cluster-level correction) (Table 2). No regions survived the
reverse contrast. An examination of the simple effects showed that
the activation in the frontal cluster during unfair proposals was
significantly stronger than during fair proposals when the stake
FIGURE 3 | Brain activations influenced by fairness and proposer type
at proposal presentation. (A) Maps of the t statistics for the contrast
[unfair > fair] showing activation of the bilateral insula, ACC, and lateral
PFC, and for the contrast [fair > unfair] showing activation of the medial
prefrontal cortex. (B) Map of the t statistic for the contrast [human >
computer] showing activation of the bilateral insula, ACC, medial prefrontal
cortex and lateral PFC. Abbreviations: ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; PFC,
prefrontal cortex.
Table 2 | Results using a factorial model for analysis of the fMRI data.
Cluster size Hemisphere Brain region BA MNI coordinates Peak T -value
FAIR > UNFAIR
369 Bilateral Medial frontal gyrus/anterior cingulate 11/32/10 6, 45, −12 4.64
FAIR < UNFAIR
2705 Bilateral Middle frontal gyrus/inferior frontal gyrus/superior
frontal gyrus/medial frontal gyrus/insula
6/10/9/8 9, 24, 42 8.66
744 Right Middle frontal gyrus/inferior frontal gyrus 9/8/6/46 42, 33, 27 5.43
377 Right Middle frontal gyrus 10 42, 51, −12 4.93
209 Right Inferior frontal gyrus/insula 47/13 36, 21, −3 5.41
HUMAN > COMPUTER
634 Right Middle frontal gyrus/inferior frontal gyrus/insula 9/46/47 45, 9, 30 4.76
252 Left Inferior frontal gyrus/insula 47/10 −27, 24, −6 4.65
619 Left Middle frontal gyrus/inferior frontal gyrus 6/9 −45, 9, 24 6.08
392 Left Medial frontal gyrus/anterior cingulate 32/9 −9, 27, 33 4.35
HIGH(UNFAIR–FAIR) > LOW(UNFAIR–FAIR)
247 Left Insula/putamen 13 −33, −6, 12 4.28
237 Right Insula/putamen 13 36, −9, 9 4.70
268 Right Middle frontal gyrus/inferior frontal gyrus 8/9/46 48, 9, 18 3.88
HIGH(UNFAIR–FAIR) > LOW(UNFAIR–FAIR) WITHIN HUMAN
135 Left Insula 13 −36, −18, 15 4.01
186 Right Insula 13 36, −6, 3 4.35
56 Left Putamen – −15, 6, −6 3.81
21 Right Inferior frontal gyrus 46 54, 39, 9 2.96
20 Right Superior frontal gyrus 8 15, 39, 48 3.12
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size was high [post-hoc pairwise comparison, F(1, 27) = 24.82, p <
0.001, partial η2 = 0.479], and a similar trend was found while
the stake size was low but did not meet statistical significance.
In addition, the activation in the frontal cluster for high mone-
tary proposals was significantly stronger than for low monetary
proposals during the unfair proposal condition [F(1, 27) = 19.33,
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.417] (Figure 4A). When we separated
the human from the computer condition to examine the inter-
action of stake size and fairness, a similar pattern of interaction
but with smaller clusters within those regions was found in the
human condition (Table 2 and Figure 4B). No regions were influ-
enced by the interaction between stake size and fairness in the
computer condition (p < 0.05, cluster-level correction).
Due to previous studies that indicated that the insular sub-
regions functioned differently when responders faced fair and
unfair proposals (Sanfey et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2011), we
divided the clusters that included the bilateral insular cortices
into subregions by intersecting them with an insular subregions
template (k = 3 solutions) (Kelly et al., 2012). When we did not
separate the human condition from the computer condition, we
found significant activation in the left dorsal-anterior insula, the
bilateral ventral-anterior insula, and the bilateral mid-posterior
insula and examined the simple effects of the modulation of fair-
ness by stake size in these insular subregions. The activation in
the left dorsal-anterior insula cortex was significantly stronger for
unfair proposals than for fair proposals when the stake size was
high [F(1, 27) = 12.04, p = 0.002, partial η2 = 0.308], but there
were no differences when the stake size was low. In addition, the
activation in the left dorsal-anterior insula cortex for low mone-
tary proposals was significantly stronger than for high monetary
proposals during the fair proposal condition [F(1, 27) = 15.53,
p = 0.001, partial η2 = 0.365]. The activations in the bilateral
mid-posterior insula cortices were significantly stronger for fair
proposals than for unfair proposals when the stake size was low
(post-hoc pairwise comparison, Fs > 14, ps = 0.001), but there
were no differences when the stake size was high. In addition,
the activations in the bilateral mid-posterior insula cortices for
low monetary proposals were significantly stronger than for high
monetary proposals during the fair proposal condition (Fs >
17, ps < 0.001). The activations of the bilateral ventral-anterior
insula cortices were similar to those of the mid-posterior insu-
lar cortices (Figure 5). When we separated the human from the
computer condition, a similar pattern of interaction in the insu-
lar subregions was found in the human condition (Figure S1).
Because the clusters also included the striatum, we divided the
clusters into subregions by intersecting them with the striatum
three subregions template (http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/
Atlases/striatumconn) in order to examine the simple effect of
each striatal subregion (for details, please see Figure S2 and other
Supplementary Materials).
NEURAL CORRELATES OF INTER-INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN THE
BEHAVIORAL MODULATION EFFECT
Multiple regression analysis was performed to determine the
regions whose BOLD signal change, which was detected using the
[high(unfair−fair) − low(unfair−fair)] contrast, varied with the mod-
ulation effect on the rejection rate. Because the pattern of the
interaction between stake size and fairness in the human condi-
tion was different from that in the computer condition, as shown
by the abovementioned analyses, in the main text we only showed
the results obtained by separating the human proposals from
the computer proposals when computing inter-individual indices
(for the results obtained by combining the human proposals with
those of the computer proposals, please see supplementary text
and Figure S3). Significantly negative correlations were found in
the left IFG (MNI coordinate = [−51, 15, 15]; p < 0.05, cluster-
level correction) in the human condition (Figure 6 and Table
S1), which suggests that a greater IFG signal for high(unfair–fair)
FIGURE 4 | Prefrontal cortices influenced by the interaction
between fairness and stake size and simple effects of the
interaction effects in (A) all the proposal conditions and (B)
the human proposal condition. Abbreviations: IFG, inferior
frontal gyrus; SFG, superior frontal gyrus. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗∗p < 0.001. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
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FIGURE 5 | Insular subregions influenced by the interaction of fairness
and stake size for all the proposals. (A) Insular subregions intersected by
Kelly’s template. (B) Kelly’s insular subregions template (k = 3 solutions). (C)
Locations of the reported insular clusters on Kelly’s template. For each
location, please see Table S3 in the Supplementary Materials. (D) Simple
effects of the modulation of fairness by stake size in insular subregions.
Abbreviations: aINS, anterior insula; pINS, posterior insula. ∗p < 0.05,
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
FIGURE 6 | (A) Regions showing the neural correlates of
inter-individual differences in the behavior modulation effect of the
rejection rate in the human proposal condition. (B) Significant
negative correlation was found in the left IFG between the bold
signal of the [high(unfair−fair) − low(unfair−fair)] contrast and the rejection
rate of the [high(unfair−fair) − low(unfair−fair)] proposals. (C) Significant
interaction effect of fairness*stake size was found in the left IFG for
participants who deviated from the fairness norm. Abbreviations: IFG,
inferior frontal gyrus. ∗p < 0.05. Error bars indicate standard errors of
the mean.
vs. low(unfair–fair) stakes predicts a significant deviation from the
fairness-related normative decision (i.e., a reduced behavioral
rejection rate for an unfair proposal with a high stake size). No
regions were found in the computer condition.
In order to take into consideration inter-individual differ-
ences, we analyzed those participants who showed a deviation
from the fairness-related normative decision in the human con-
dition (n = 17). By extracting the value of the mean of the
interaction effect, the cluster in the left IFG showed a significant
interaction effect (left IFG: t = 2.79, p = 0.013). We also con-
ducted a one-sample t-test to examine the voxel-wise interaction
effect contrast in these participants. The bilateral insula and IFG
showed significant interaction effects (Table S2).
DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to explore the neural substrates of
the influence of monetary incentives on fairness. One impor-
tant characteristic of our study was that we designed a computer
condition, which shared many features with the human con-
dition (e.g., fair perception, self-interest), but in which there
were no social interactions. The computer condition provided
us with an opportunity to investigate whether modulating the
monetary incentive influences the perception of fairness only
in a social interaction context. By distinguishing fairness level
from offer amount, at the behavioral level we found that the
magnitude of the stake size significantly modulated the rejection
rates. Specifically, the rejection rates for unfair proposals with
a high stake size were significantly lower than those for unfair
proposals with a low stake size, a finding that was consistent
with previous reports (Straub and Murnighan, 1995; Hoffman
et al., 1996; Slonim and Roth, 1998; Cameron, 1999; Munier
and Zaharia, 2003; Bechler, 2013). This behavioral deviation
from the normative decision was reflected in their brain acti-
vation. As hypothesized, the fairness-related activations of the
bilateral insular cortices and the right lateral PFC were modu-
lated by the monetary incentives although different simple effects
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were identified. These modulation effects were only observed in
the human condition, not in the computer condition, indicat-
ing that the modulation effect of fairness by monetary incentives
only exists in social interaction situations. When we linked inter-
individual differences in this behavioral modulation effect with
brain activation, the left IFG was found to play a critical role
in making the fairness-related normative decision in the social
interaction condition.
MODULATION EFFECTS IN THE FRONTAL CORTICES
The activation in the right DLPFC during the UG is often con-
sidered to reflect the involvement of cognitive control (Sanfey
et al., 2003; Knoch et al., 2006a,b, 2008; Knoch and Fehr, 2007;
Brune et al., 2012). However, there are different hypotheses about
the psychological processes behind the activation of the right
DLPFC during the UG. Some of them are partially divergent.
For example, one view is that, in order to implement culturally
acquired fairness norms, the right DLPFC is necessary to con-
trol the selfish motives of resource maximization (Knoch et al.,
2006a,b, 2008; Knoch and Fehr, 2007). Another view is that the
right DLPFC is involved in suppressing emotion-driven prepo-
tent responses to perceived unfairness (Brune et al., 2012). An
integration-and-selection hypothesis of the right DLPFC can be
used to reconcile these divergent perspectives (Buckholtz and
Marois, 2012). Specifically, the right DLPFC’s involvement in the
UG reflects an integration-and-selection function, which includes
the inhibition of a prepotent response and the selection of a
specific response from all the possible response options by inte-
grating the current information with context-specific rules about
how to apply this information (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012).
According to this hypothesis, we speculated that in the context of
an unfair proposal with a high stake size, such as that in the cur-
rent study, if the self-interest impulse was the prepotent response,
then the right DLPFC could be expected to be activated to inhibit
this self-interest impulse, which led to an increased rejection rate.
If the emotional (rejection) impulse was the prepotent response,
in order to control the emotional impulse induced by unfair pro-
posals, the right DLPFC could be expected to be activated, which
would then lead to a reduced rejection rate. We found that the
right DLPFC showed the modulation effect, as evidenced by an
increased activation when facing an unfair proposal with a high
stake size, in which lower rejection rate was observed. This result
is consistent with the latter speculation.
In addition, we noted that the interaction effect in the lateral
PFC was only seen when the proposals were from a human rather
than a computer, which suggests a particular role of this region
in a social interaction context. When a human made the pro-
posal, the activations of both the right IFG and the right SFG
were modulated by monetary incentives on fairness. However,
there may be different explanations for the results from these two
regions. The modulation effect in the right IFGmay be accounted
for by cognitive control for emotion-driven prepotent responses
to perceived unfairness, based on previous evidence from neu-
rophysiological, lesion, and task-based functional neuroimaging
studies which suggest that cognitive control is associated with the
right IFG (for a review, see Aron et al., 2004). The modulation
effect in the right SFGmay be attributed to emotional reappraisal.
A recent UG study found that down-regulation strategies acti-
vated the right SFG (Grecucci et al., 2013). Monetary incentives
have been found to decrease negative emotions (Zhou et al.,
2009). Therefore, it is possible that large monetary incentives in
the UG task may have played a role similar to that of an emo-
tional down reappraisal by down-regulating the negative emo-
tion, inducing strong activation in the right SFG, and thusmaking
the participant more likely to accept an unfair offer with a high
stake size.
Although previous studies have implicated the frontal cortices
in UG behavior (such as Sanfey et al., 2003), the high stake size
in the present study may have amplified the process of evalua-
tion when the participants were making their decisions. The fact
that the activation of the lateral PFC increased when facing an
unfair proposal with a high stake size further clarifies the role of
the frontal cortex in normative decision making. This role may
well be to process the multiple motives and integrate them with
emotional reactions to produce a context-appropriate decision
(Buckholtz and Marois, 2012).
DISSOCIABLE MODULATION EFFECTS IN THE INSULAR SUBREGIONS
In the present study, we found a dissociable pattern of the mag-
nitude effect in the insular subregions. The insula is a cytoar-
chitectonically diverse cortical region and has been proposed as
a nexus of sensory, somatic, interoceptive, cognitive, and emo-
tional processing (Craig, 2009, 2011). These functions have been
mapped into different subregions of the insula (Kurth et al., 2010;
Kelly et al., 2012). In the context of the UG task, distinct fairness-
related processes are expressed in segregated regions of the insula
(Wright et al., 2011). Our findings also indicate that the distinct
fairness-related processes expressed in the insula are modulated
by monetary incentives.
The activation of anterior insula in the UG has often been
suggested as resulting from the negative emotion triggered by
unfairness (such as Sanfey et al., 2003). However, based on find-
ings of functional differentiation in the insula (Kurth et al., 2010;
Kelly et al., 2012), a recent study proposed a more attractive
opinion that the anterior insula integrates information about
modality-specific feelings with cognitive processes, individual
preferences, and contextual information in order to promote
fairness-related behavior (Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013). Our
findings support this idea. By closely examining the locations of
these insular clusters in various sources (Sanfey et al., 2003;
Tabibnia et al., 2008; Chang and Sanfey, 2009; Halko et al., 2009;
Guroglu et al., 2010, 2011; Gospic et al., 2011; Kirk et al., 2011;
Wright et al., 2011; Harle and Sanfey, 2012; Harle et al., 2012;
Kim et al., 2012; Corradi-Dell’Acqua et al., 2013; Grecucci et al.,
2013; Guo et al., 2013), we found that the reported peak coordi-
nates of the anterior insular clusters located in the dorsal-anterior
part of the insula according to Kelly’s template are most associated
with cognition, unlike those of the ventral-anterior insula which
are most associated with emotion (Table S1 and Figure 5C).
Similarly, we found a significant modulation effect in this dorsal-
anterior portion of the insula, not in the typical ventral-anterior
insula. A further analysis showed that the significant modula-
tion effect in the dorsal-anterior insula seems to have resulted
from increased activity in connection with the fair proposal in
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the low stake size. Combining these neuroimaging findings with
our behavioral finding from the fairness judgment scores that
indicated that the fair proposal with a low stake size seemed
less fair compared with the fair proposal with a high stake size,
we speculate that perhaps the contextual information (i.e., both
the low and high stake sizes in this study) induced a negative
emotional response to fair proposals with a low stake size and
that this integrated information was reflected in the activation of
the left dorsal-anterior insula. However, this explanation needs
to be considered with caution because the interaction effect in
the left dorsal-anterior insula disappeared when only the human
condition rounds were analyzed. Therefore, the present study
indicated that the dorsal-anterior insula responds to fair and
unfair proposals differently depending on the size of the mon-
etary stake, suggesting that the left dorsal-anterior insula may
play a role in detecting social norm violations by integrating
emotion and cognition in connection with specific contextual
information.
Unlike the anterior insula, the modulation effects in the bilat-
eral mid-posterior insula and the adjacent ventral insula were
connected with decreased activity in response to the fair pro-
posal with a high stake size. In the low stake size condition, the
activation of the posterior insula was stronger for the fair pro-
posals than for the unfair proposals. This finding is consistent
with a previous study (Wright et al., 2011). A low stake size was
used in that study in which Wright and his colleague found a
negative correlation with inequality in the posterior insula (i.e.,
greater activation for a more equal allocation). These researchers
used prediction error to explain their observation. That is, when
the subjects formed predictions about inequality, an equal pro-
posal led to a prediction error, which induced stronger activity in
the posterior insula (Wright et al., 2011). We speculated that this
seems true in the low stake size. However, in our study, in the high
stake size condition, we found no differences between the fair and
unfair proposals in the posterior insula, suggesting a modulation
role of stake size on the activation of the posterior insula. In brief,
the posterior insula may respond differently to fair and unfair
proposals depending on the size of the monetary stake. This pat-
tern is different from what we observed for the dorsal-anterior
insula.
NEURAL CORRELATES OF INTER-INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN
BEHAVIORAL MODULATION EFFECTS
Money talks, but maybe not for everyone. Neural correlates of
inter-individual differences in the deviation from fairness-related
normative choices were also investigated in this study. Our data
indicated that this behavioral inter-individual difference was asso-
ciated with inter-individual differences in the modulation effects
in the activation of the left IFG.Whenwe differentiated the partic-
ipants who showed a behavioral modulation effect from the whole
group, the left IFG also showed a significant modulation effect.
The neural correlates reflected that a participant who was more
likely to make a decision that deviated from the fairness norm
showed increased activation in the left IFG when facing an unfair
proposal with a high stake size. A possible explanation for this
neural correlate is that a large monetary temptation may induce a
strong conflict between fairness and self-interest and thus require
greater cognitive control. In the context of the current experi-
mental design, the psychological process of cognitive control is
likely to control emotion-driven prepotent responses to perceived
unfairness, which could have led to a reduced rejection rate and
a high level of activation for an unfair proposal with a high
stake size. A core component of cognitive control—the ability to
regulate thoughts and actions in accordance with internally rep-
resented behavioral goals—may be its intrinsic variability, which
may be reflected in differences in the activations of the prefrontal
cortices (Braver, 2012). Because the left IFG is also involved in
cognitive control (Aron et al., 2004), during the UG individual
differences in cognitive control may appear there. Additionally, a
trend toward significance in the correlation between the modula-
tion effects in the rejection rate and the modulation effects in the
activation of the bilateral ACC (Table S1) supports our hypothesis
that regions related to conflict and cognitive control participate
in dealing with the conflict between fairness and self-interest
resulting from a large monetary temptation.
Another possible explanation is that this neural correlate
reflects inter-individual differences in emotional regulation.
Previous studies have linked the IFG with emotion reappraisal
(for a review, see Ochsner and Gross, 2005). A recent study fur-
ther found that, when facing unfair proposals, the activation
of the left IFG induced by emotional reappraisal was positively
correlated with the ability to regulate emotion, as measured
by an emotion regulation questionnaire (Grecucci et al., 2013).
We speculate that some stable traits, such as reward sensitiv-
ity and personality, could account for our observed individual
differences in norm enforcement, in line with the opinion that
cognitive and personality factors may influence cognitive con-
trol (Braver, 2012). Previous studies have suggested that inter-
individual differences in personalities (straightforwardness and
trust) and central serotonin transmission account for individual
differences in people’s reaction to unfairness (Takahashi et al.,
2012). Future studies need to further explore the psychologi-
cal and neurobiological mechanisms underlying inter-individual
differences in norm enforcement. An important reason why we
should consider these inter-individual differences and their neu-
ral correlates is that aberrant social behavior has often been
observed in psychiatric disorders (Kishida et al., 2010; Hasler,
2012), so investigating the neural correlates of individual dif-
ferences in healthy participants may be helpful for understand-
ing the neural basis of aberrant social behavior in psychiatric
patients.
Taking into consideration all of the above results, we have
provided neural evidence for the modulation of fairness by
the size of a monetary incentive. By manipulating monetary
incentives to alter the fairness-related normative decision, we
have provided deeper insight into the neural substrates of the
normal normative decision.
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